

Electromagnetic Compatibility Issues for Home-to-Grid Devices

by the

Home-to-Grid Domain Expert Working Group (H2G DEWG)

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The primary goal of this paper is to ensure that Home-to-Grid devices address EMC adequately when deployed.

The Situation

The H2G DEWG believes that for the Smart Grid (SG) to achieve its potential it must be reliable, secure, and fault-tolerant. One of the key issues that must be addressed is Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC), which is the ability to withstand the electromagnetic (EM) environment (sufficient immunity) without causing interference (disturbances) to others.

For Home-to-Grid devices to function properly and to coexist with other electrical and electronic systems in the home, they must be designed with due consideration for electromagnetic emissions from the grid or home and for immunity to various electromagnetic phenomena near the grid or in the home. They must also take into consideration the devices that are already present in the home to minimize interference to those products. Finally, EMC considerations must take the view that the home and the smart grid are a system since some issues such as surges caused by sources external to the home like lightning strikes, cannot be remedied at the end device. Potential approaches will be suggested below.

As noted in the paper, IEEE EMC Society Standards Development Committee position paper, *EMC Considerations in Home-to-Grid Devices*, there are four broad categories of EMC events that need to be considered:

1. Commonly-occurring EMC events like electrostatic discharges, fast transients and power line disturbances.
2. RF interference from various kinds of wireless transmitters.
3. Coexistence with wireless transmitters so that wireless communications can be incorporated beneficially (reliably) into the Smart Grid.
4. High-level EMC disturbances, both intentional terrorist acts and naturally occurring events, such as lightning surges and geomagnetic storms.

33 The Smart Grid and its components should be designed to be immune to the extent
34 possible and economically feasible, and if that immunity fails, to be fault-tolerant, so
35 that failures do not lead to systemic disruption. At the same time, the signals used to
36 control the grid should not cause interference to other devices. Therefore, emissions
37 must be at the very least within regulatory limits whether they are via the power lines
38 (conducted) or over-the-air from nearby sources (radiated). However any “harmful”
39 interference to licensed radio services may require more stringent emission limitations
40 or further separation from the equipment affected.

41 1. Commonly-occurring EMC events

42 Manufacturers of Home-to-Grid equipment should consider a variety of
43 electromagnetic phenomena to minimize operational failures or upsets of Home-to-
44 Grid equipment and systems. A variety of phenomena are known. They include for
45 example, electrostatic discharge (ESD), electrical fast transient (EFT), surge and
46 radiated and conducted RF energy. Inadequate immunity to interference can cause
47 communication or control failures of Home-to-Grid components, leading to
48 interruptions of communication to individual loads (such as appliances) or a home
49 control system, rendering load devices unavailable for Demand Response events.

50 Phenomena that can cause upset to the Smart Grid can originate from sources located
51 both outside the home and within the home. One of the most important phenomena is
52 lightning, as typical lightning strikes are measured in tens of thousands of amperes
53 creating large voltage potentials between equipment grounds and utility services (e.g.,
54 ground potential of a pool house to main house). Lightning effects on the power grid
55 itself are well known, and mitigation measures are a normal part of any power grid
56 topology mitigation. However, indirect lightning strikes on the grid, nearby
57 structures, or from nearby ground strikes can cause failures in unprotected
58 communications, control systems, and individual devices within the home.

59 A. Surge:

60 Protection from electrical surges is handled in a four layered approach. First, the
61 utility or service provider (cable/telephony) provides high-level surge protection “at
62 the pole”. Second, all wires, both line (AC wiring) and low voltage (cable/telephony,
63 communications/control wiring to outdoor equipment such as pool and gate controls,
64 security systems, etc.) entering or leaving the home should have surge protection, also
65 called whole home surge protection. These first two levels of protection cover EMC
66 sources outside the home with the second also providing protection from high voltage
67 spikes generated within the home. Third, high value devices such as computers, TVs,
68 etc. should have local or outlet surge protection, which may be included in the outlet
69 itself or in an “outlet surge strip”. This helps to eliminate surges from motors
70 (vacuum cleaners, etc.), lighting controls (dimmers, switching), and other in-home
71 sources. And finally, the end device should include low-level surge protection,
72 especially in higher value devices that are critical to proper SG operation. However,

73 it should be noted that the primary element used for surge protection has a limited life
74 expectancy based on the number and size of the surges it experiences. Thus, end-
75 device surge protection is not considered a primary solution since they are not field
76 replaceable. Most entrance, receptacle, and higher quality surge strips include a
77 visual indicator when the element needs replacement, thus indicating when
78 replacement is required.

79 Note that the first three levels of surge protection lie outside the control of the end-
80 device manufacturer and therefore must be included in either a “best practices” or
81 installation guideline. For high-value devices, testing to a standard such as CISPR 24
82 or the equivalent is recommended. The levels to test to are variable and depend on the
83 RF environment, which will differ from home to grid to power source. Any such
84 recommendations would need to be in an installation guideline or best practices
85 document.

86 Immunity from EMC interference for most CE products sold in the US is voluntary
87 and driven by market forces. Devices that are found to be unreliable are either
88 redesigned by the manufacturer to fix the problem or are rejected by the consumer or
89 outlet channel. This is essentially the same as for other non-safety related reliability
90 issues involving poor or inadequate design. If a store or manufacturer gets too many
91 complaints, the product goes off the market. Warranty repairs, product returns to the
92 retailer/manufacturer, and recall for safety related issues are paths by which defective
93 products are removed from use. However, to ensure reliability of the Demand
94 Response and metering/billing systems installed, sold, or supplied by a utility,
95 immunity tests such as those defined in CISPR 24 with the proper test levels could be
96 added to their RFQ.

97 B. Electrical Fast Transients

98 Electrical fast transients may also propagate on a power line, having originated in
99 switching operations on the lines. These bursts of low-energy, fast rise-time impulses
100 can interrupt or latch-up communications or control signals on the lines, or interrupt
101 equipment connected to the lines. They are very common and very disruptive. Outlet
102 and end-device surge components are used to protect against this form of
103 electromagnetic interference. It is recommended that outlet/strip surge protectors
104 used in a SG installation include such fast transient protection. The rating however
105 must be determined for adequacy. The installation guideline or best practices
106 document may include recommendations on ratings.

107 C. Radiated and Conducted Emissions

108 Unintended emissions (both conducted over the power lines and those emitted into the
109 air) from Home-to-Grid systems have the potential to cause harmful interference to
110 licensed broadcast and communications systems as well as other nearby electronic
111 systems. Limits for these emissions are of critical importance in minimizing the

112 potential for such interference. Limits are specified in the US by the Federal
113 Communications Commission. Methods of measurement to determine compliance
114 with such limits exist and are also specified by the FCC. Note that even when
115 meeting such limits FCC Part 15 requires that if harmful interference is caused, the
116 user must rectify the problem. This is often accomplished by moving or reorienting
117 the device. However, if it cannot be otherwise rectified, the device must be taken out
118 of service. Harmful interference is generally that which disrupts licensed radio
119 services such as TV and law enforcement frequencies.

120 2. Interference from wireless transmitters

121 Radio-frequency currents on power, communications, and control lines result from
122 radio transmitters in the environment. These transmitters may be fixed in frequency,
123 power, and location, as is the case for broadcast transmitters and cellular telephone
124 base stations, or they may be flexible in terms of frequency, power, or location
125 relative to the home, especially if they are moved about the home coming close to the
126 SG electronics, e.g., meters. Such transmitters may be mobile police, fire, citizen's
127 band, or amateur radio or even over the air AM, TV and FM signals. Power levels of
128 such transmitters range from 5 Watts or less to as much as 1,500 Watts; TV and FM
129 can be as much as 50,000 watts or more, but are not typically installed in close
130 proximity to the user's premises. These transmitters may be modulated using a variety
131 of techniques. All of these aspects should be examined to determine the appropriate
132 electromagnetic environment for critical Home-to-Grid equipment testing and the
133 criteria and measurement techniques to be used for judging acceptance.. In the US
134 consumer electronics devices are not mandated to be immune from interference from
135 these devices. Instead, it is assumed the market will be self-policing as noted above
136 or by moving the sensitive equipment to another location. However, for devices
137 critical to the reliable operation of the Smart Grid, testing to voluntary immunity
138 standards may be advisable. Again CISPR 24 contains the most used immunity
139 standards for IT equipment. Further, as noted above, utilities providing such devices
140 may wish to include immunity testing and certification of the testing organization to
141 determine compliance as a part of their RFQ process.

142 3. Co-existence of Wireless transmitters

143 A related issue arises from the intentional use of wireless devices in the home, since
144 the unlicensed frequency bands they generally use are not protected (for their
145 exclusive use). Any device operating in these "public" frequency bands has to accept
146 interference from other transmitters in those same frequency bands. Hence,
147 unlicensed wireless transmitters have the potential to cause interference with other
148 equipment. However, wireless deployments can be planned to co-exist and even
149 interoperate with other equipment reliably. This is based on a stable situation. Once
150 these devices are moved or a new service in these frequency bands is introduced, new
151 co-existence issues may arise. Guidance to utilities should state that they need to
152 understand the environment and design/specify accordingly to avoid existing users of

153 the proposed RF spectrum. Without effective planning, supported by appropriate
154 analysis and research, wireless devices can conflict with one another (even in different
155 bands when in close proximity) and with wired devices, causing disruption of
156 communications and failure of important Demand Response or metering/billing
157 functions.

158 It should be noted that in-band interference to existing products in the home (e.g.,
159 baby monitors) such as reported in some smart meter installations operating in
160 unlicensed bands is not an EMC issue. There is no way to guarantee non-interference
161 in such cases. Instead, it is advisable that utilities, smart meter manufacturers, and
162 manufacturers of other SG devices choose wireless frequency bands and technologies
163 that avoid interference to existing in-home devices. This will serve to minimize
164 consumer backlash and safety issues with, for example, home medical devices by
165 avoiding the use of spectrum already used for these purposes.

166 High level EM disturbances

167 The electromagnetic phenomena discussed above are those that occur on a routine
168 basis in the home. Given, however, the planned role of the Smart Grid in operating
169 the national power grid, it is also important to consider additional electromagnetic
170 phenomena that are considered security risks and/or lower-probability risks. There
171 are three high-power electromagnetic (HPEM) threats that are considered in the IEEE
172 EMC Society and for which equipment may be protected. These include the High-
173 altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) created by a nuclear detonation in space,
174 Intentional Electromagnetic Interference (IEMI) caused by electromagnetic weapons
175 used by criminals and terrorists and Severe Geomagnetic Storms created by solar
176 activity. Both the HEMP and Severe Geomagnetic Storms can cause regional power
177 blackouts and permanent damage to large transformers due to the creation of severe
178 harmonics and hot-spot heating. This topic applies primarily to utility-wide
179 disturbances rather than in-home devices, although severe harmonics may
180 simultaneously damage electronic equipment at meters or in homes. However, it is
181 not anticipated that in-home equipment will be able to provide cost-effective
182 protection against such disturbances.

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