Discussion of Barcodes/Encoding

This document highlights the discussion around the use of barcodes/encoded information by a voting system. There are requirements within the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG) 2.0 that are specific to barcodes or encoded information produced by a voting system. Barcodes are noted as an open area for the standard due to concerns around integrity, transparency, auditability, interoperability and ballot secrecy.

Decision Points
- What information can be encoded or stored in barcodes?
- Does this topic include similar markings on a ballot (e.g., timing marks or mark-sense)?

Use Cases

**Current Uses of Barcodes in Elections**

| ▪ Store and apply ballot activation information (e.g., ballot style) | ▪ Apply voter accessibility options |
| ▪ Store voter registration number on ballots submitted through vote-by-mail | ▪ Capture ballot selections at the polling place |
| ▪ Use stored ballot selections for tabulation | ▪ Store ballot selections prior to entering polling place (e.g., Interactive Sample Ballot Transfer) |
| ▪ Store ballot identifier | ▪ Input CVR data |
| ▪ Printing/recreating mail-in ballots (Ballot on Demand) | ▪ Remotely transferring aggregation of unofficial tabulation results |

**Future Uses of Barcodes in Elections**

| ▪ Compare ballot selections in barcode with human-readable text | ▪ Store checksum value that notifies of any discrepancies in interpretation of human-readable text |
| ▪ Store digital signature to verify the data is from a valid BMD and a checksum to identify any discrepancies | ▪ Preserve ballot secrecy by storing encryption data that only provides the necessary information for a ballot comparison audit |
| ▪ Protect against coercion by storing a crypto-code that verifies valid ballots vs. faux ballots (Ballot Selfies Coercion) | ▪ In context of the VSAP system, using the barcode to store E2E Verifiable back-end verification data (e.g., Seed data) |
The following sections describe the concerns with using or excluding barcodes in the voting system and suggested mitigations to those concerns. The concerns and mitigations do not represent a consensus opinion, but rather an aggregation of what was discussed by the cybersecurity working group.

Primary Concerns with Using Barcodes

**Concern A. Principle 3: Transparency, Guideline 3.3 - The public can understand and verify the operations of the voting system throughout the entirety of the election.**

Barcodes lack transparency. They are not human-readable, meaning a voter/election worker is unable to easily read and understand what information is stored in a barcode. Poor or maliciously designed barcodes may allow for unauthorized transmission of data (e.g. data leakage). This data may include, voter identifying information or malicious input to the voting system.

**Concern B. Principle 7: Marked, Verified, and Cast as Intended - Ballots and vote selections are presented in a perceivable, operable, and understandable way and can be marked, verified, and cast by all voters.**

If a voter’s ballot selections are stored in a barcode, the lack of human-readability of that barcode, means the voter may be unable to verify that their ballot selections are accurately captured within the barcode.

**Concern C. Principle 9: Auditable, Guideline 9.1 - An error or fault in the voting system software or hardware cannot cause an undetectable change in election results.**

Barcodes alone are not software independent. In the case of a presentation attack, a vote capture device may display the voter selecting one contest when they are actually selecting another (a.k.a. clickjacking). Malicious/faulty production of a barcode or barcode reader may present inaccurate information to a voter or election worker. For example, a malicious barcode may present the voter with different ballot selections than what will be interpreted by the voting machine. If barcodes are used for tabulation of cast ballots, any modification of a voter’s ballot selections may go undetected and impact the election results. Another concern is how discrepancies can be detected and how to handle issues of mismatching information.

**Concern D. Principle 10: Ballot Secrecy, Guideline 10.2 - The voting system does not contain nor produce records, notifications, information about the voter or other election artifacts that can be used to associate the voter’s identity with the voter’s intent, choices, or selections.**

Some barcodes are used to activate the ballot, apply ballot style, and/or apply accessibility options to a vote capture device. This information may come from an e-pollbook. The lack of transparency makes it unclear whether the barcode stores
any voter identifying information that can be used to link a voter to their ballot selections. If a barcode does include voter identifying information and that information is stored by the voting system, than it would violate the principle of ballot secrecy.

D.1. Principle 10: Ballot Secrecy, Guideline 10.2 - The voting system does not contain nor produce records, notifications, information about the voter or other election artifacts that can be used to associate the voter’s identity with the voter’s intent, choices, or selections.

In the use case where, a voter can store their ballot selections prior to entering polling place (e.g., Interactive Sample Ballot Transfer), a voter may be coerced into filling out their sample ballot in a manner that goes against their own opinion. Voters can use the barcode to present the coercer with proof of their vote selections. Voters may also be offered a reward to vote a specific way and required to provide proof to receive the reward.

Concern E. Principle 15: System Integrity - The voting system performs its intended function in an unimpaired manner, free from unauthorized manipulation of the system, whether intentional or accidental.

A barcode can store additional data that can be used to inject malicious commands into a voting system. A barcode could potentially input malicious commands that modify data, inject malware, or give unauthorized access to election data. In addition to the modification of election results as mentioned under the auditable principle, the injection of malware may modify system data to force the machine to perform in an unintended manner or not perform at all (e.g., Denial of Service).

Suggested Mitigations:
It is not within the scope of the VVSG to require audits, specify what types of audits states should perform, and how states should review their voting system’s services. The below mitigations may be dependent on whether a state requires audits and reviews/analyzes any implementation documentation. This notion and suggested mitigations may apply to various other requirements and is not something that is only necessary for barcodes.

Principle 4: Interoperable, Guideline 4.2 - Standard, publicly-available formats for other types of data are used, where available.

Due to the potential lack of transparency, awareness of the contents of a barcode is vital to ensure the barcode only contains the necessary information for its function. This concern would imply the need for a way to verify that the barcode/encoding scheme does not contain any opportunities for data leakage or malicious input. This verification would require documentation that gives insight into the implementation used to encode and decode information in a barcode. This documentation may be used to develop a barcode reader that is able to reproduce a ballot based on the information captured within the barcode.

Applies to concerns: A, D, E
Principle 7: Marked, Verified, and Cast as Intended, Guideline 7.3 - Voters can understand all information as it is presented, including instructions, messages from the system, and error messages. Including the human readable version of the voter’s ballot selections gives voter’s the opportunity to verify their selections before submitting their ballots.

Applies to concerns: B

Principle 9: Auditable, Guideline 9.1 - An error or fault in the voting system software or hardware cannot cause an undetectable change in election results. Inclusion of the human readable selections made by a voter, allows for a way to ensure an error or fault in the reading of a barcode can be detected. An audit (e.g., risk limiting audit) should be performed using the human readable selections. When election workers/auditors are performing the audit, they will be able to reference and verify the human readable selections to confirm accurate tabulation results.

For the scenario mentioned in Concern D.1, at the polling place, the voter is given the opportunity to review, modify, and confirm their choices before printing their selections. Below are two options for handling this review process:

- The voter is provided with a summary of their ballot selections and has the choice of whether to change or confirm and of their selections.
- The voter individually confirms each selection and is offered the opportunity to make a change before moving to the next selection. This mitigates against any coercion/vote buying that may occur prior to the voter casting their ballot.

Applies to concerns: C, D.1

Primary Concerns of Excluding the Use of Barcodes

Note: The mitigations listed below each concern suggest ways that barcodes can address the concerns. This is not to imply that barcodes are the only solution to these concerns. One alternative to barcodes is Optical Character Recognition (OCR).

Concern F. Principle 6: Voter Privacy - Voters can mark, verify, and cast their ballot privately and independently. A voter may require specific accessibility settings on a vote capture device to place their vote or review their ballot selections. This may require an election worker to assist the voter by manually applying the accessibility settings. This may cause increased wait times at precincts.

Suggested Mitigation: With barcodes, a voter may be able to automatically apply the necessary settings without additional assistance. Also, a voter may be able to make their ballot selections in the comfort of their home, utilizing their own
accessibility tools and storing their selections in a barcode. Then once the voter reaches the polling place, a voter can populate their selections and potentially decrease their time placing and reviewing their votes.

**Concern G.  Principle 7: Marked, Verified, and Cast as Intended - Ballots and vote selections are presented in a perceivable, operable, and understandable way and can be marked, verified, and cast by all voters.**

The principle emphasizes that voting systems should support all voters. The voting system must support voters with disabilities such as lack of sight or low vision. If someone is unable to see the text, than concern B and it’s suggested mitigation would not apply that voter.

**Suggested Mitigation:** A barcode could be interpreted by the voting systems and read to the voter their ballot selections.

**Concern H.  Principle 9: Auditable, Guideline 9.4 - The voting system supports efficient audits.**

Without barcodes, an election worker may have to manually input the data necessary to process a ballot including, ballot style, ballot identifiers, CVR data, etc. This could lead to increased time and effort spent processing ballots.

**Suggested Mitigation:** Alternatively, barcodes can be used as a faster way to input the data for processing.
Barcode Analysis
This section steps through a list of barcode uses cases that are relevant to scope of the VVSG requirements. Each use case is followed by concerns, suggested mitigations and related requirements.

Store Ballot Activation Information (e.g., ballot style) & Apply Voter Accessibility Options
A barcode is scanned to present a voter with the correct ballot style for their particular political party and/or location. The barcode may also be used to apply a voter’s accessibility options to a ballot marking device (e.g., audio and visual settings).

Concerns
Ballot Secrecy Violation
The activation data encoded in the barcode may uniquely identify the voter. If this information is recorded in the e-pollbook as well as the Ballot Marking Device, then it would be possible to link the identity of voters to their voted ballots.

Lack of Transparency
Information within barcodes is not human-readable. Special hardware and software may be needed to read the barcode or parse the information contained in the barcode. Due to this, a voter does not have full visibility or awareness of the information stored in the barcode and being transferred into the voting system. The encoded information may include information that can identify a voter.

Mitigations
Ensure Unlinkability of Ballots
Ensure that the voting system does not receive any voter information that can be used to link a voter to their ballot selections. Below are two possible options:

1. The ballot activation data should not contain any unique identifiers that can be associated with a voter. For example, the barcode may only contain an identifier for the ballot style.
2. The activation data might be specific to a voter but is not included on the marked ballots or stored in any way that could be associated to a particular ballot.

Provide Barcode + Human Readable Format
To increase transparency, a decoded human readable format is provided to give the voter visibility of the information stored in the barcode. One option for this solution, is the human readable format will display the activation code that is stored in the barcode. The voter can then reference a codebook or a table that displays their ballot style based on the activation code.

Device and/or Application to Decode Barcode
A separate device and/or application is provided to the voter to decode the barcode and verify its contents. This requires the voter to trust the results displayed by the device/application.

Provide Human Readable Format Only
To give full transparency, do not encode information in a barcode and only provide human readable information. In this scenario, the voting system would be required to read information from the pre-voting slip using optical character recognition (OCR).

**Related Requirements**

10.2-L – Activation device records
This requirement is found under the ballot secrecy principle and restricts activation devices from including information that can be used to expose a voter’s identity.

3.3-Transparency Guideline
This guideline under the Transparency principle states that the public must be able to understand and verify voting system operations throughout the election process.

4.1 Interoperability Guideline
This guideline under the Interoperability Principle requires voting system data, such as barcode information, to be imported and exported in an interoperable format. Interoperability allows barcode data to be interpreted the same way across different types of voting system.

4.2 Interoperability Guideline
This guideline requires that barcode implementation use a standard publicly available format.

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**Pre-voting/Store Ballot Selections Prior to Entering Polling Place (e.g., Interactive Sample Ballot Transfer)**

A voter uses their personal device to record their selections, which are then presented or stored in a barcode. The voter takes the barcode to a polling place and scans the barcode to automatically populate the voter’s ballot selections. This technique provides additional usability and accessibility value. For example, voters with low literacy or cognitive disabilities are able to vote at their own speed. Blind voters have the opportunity to avoid the slow BMD audio interface.

**Concerns**

*Ballot Secrecy Violation/Lack of Transparency*
Information within barcodes is not readily understandable to the human eye and require additional technology to translate the encoded information. Due to the encoding, a voter does not have full visibility or awareness of the information stored in the barcode and transferred into the voting system. The encoded information may include more than just the voter’s ballot selections and may inadvertently identify a voter.

*Voter Coercion/Vote Buying*
Prior to entering the polling place a voter is coerced into filling out their sample ballot in a manner that goes against their own opinion. Voters can use the barcode to present the coercer with proof of their vote selections. Voters may also be offered a reward to vote a specific way and required to provide proof to receive the reward.

*Presentation/Spoofing Attack*
A malicious website/application masquerades as a legitimate election service and presents a voter with the option to complete their ballot. The malicious website/application may display the voter selecting one contest when they are actually selecting something else (clickjacking). Additionally, malicious or faulty production of a barcode may present the voter with different information than what is interpreted by the machine.

**Mitigations**

*Enforce Ballot Secrecy*

Ensure that the voting system does not receive any voter information from the barcode that can be used to link a voter to their ballot selections.

*Give the Opportunity for Voter Verification/Modification*

At the polling place, the voter has the opportunity to review, modify, and confirm their choices before printing their selections. This mitigates against any coercion/vote buying that may occur prior to the voter casting their ballot.

*Application or Device to decode Barcode*

A separate device and/or application is provided to the voter to decode the barcode and verify its contents. This requires the voter to trust the results displayed by the device/application.

*Provide Barcode + Human Readable Format*

To increase transparency, a decoded human readable format is provided to give the voter visibility of the information stored in the barcode. For this use case, the barcode would contain...

*Provide Human Readable Format Only*

To give full transparency, do not encode information in a barcode and only provide human readable information. This would require a voter to print a full ballot with their ballot selections rather than just a barcode. The voting system would then read information directly from the printed ballot using OCR.

**Related requirements**

*9.1.3-A – Records for voter verification*

This requirement states the voting system must produce a record that allows the voter to verify their selections were correctly interpreted.

*9.1.3-B – Identification of errors*

This requirement states that the voting system must provide the voter with the opportunity to identify any errors in their selections before submitting their ballot for tabulation.

*9.1.5-C – Paper record intelligibility*

This requirement implies that a voting system must print a record that represents the voter’s ballot selections in a manner understandable by the voter. If a barcode is used to capture ballot selections, an additional human readable format must also be available.
3.3 Transparency Guideline
This guideline under the Transparency principle states that the public must be able to understand and verify voting system operations throughout the election process.

4.1 Interoperability Guideline
This guideline under the Interoperability Principle requires voting system data, such as barcode information, to be imported and exported in an interoperable format. Interoperability allows barcode data to be interpreted across different types of voting system.

4.2 Interoperability Guideline
This guideline requires that barcode implementation use a standard publicly available format.

Capture Ballot Selections at the Polling Place and Use for Tabulation
A ballot marking device prints a barcode on a ballot that stores a voter’s ballot selections. This barcode is scanned to include a voter’s ballot selections in the tabulation.

Process Mail-In Ballots
Mail-in ballots may not be printed on the paper size/type necessary to be fed into a tabulation system. Similar to Interactive Sample Ballots, the code on the ballot can be used to “remake” the ballot onto a standard ballot card, perhaps using a ballot on demand (BoD) system. However, with mail-in ballots the voter does not have the opportunity to review, modify or confirm their ballot selections before they are processed.

Concerns
Ballot Secrecy Violation/Lack of Transparency
Encoded information in barcodes is not readily understandable by the voter. This leaves voters unaware of any voter identifying data that may link them to their cast ballots, such as unique identifiers, sequential identifiers, or timestamps.

Presentation/Spoofing Attack
If barcodes are the primary tool used for tabulation of cast ballots, it is important that the barcode information matches the voter’s ballot selections. Some key concerns include:

- How can a voter be sure their ballot selections match the information captured in the barcode?
- How can discrepancies be detected? How to handle issues of mismatching information?

Mitigations
Enforce Ballot Secrecy
Ensure that barcodes do not contain any voter information that can be used to link a voter to their ballot selections.

Provide Barcode + Human Readable Format
To increase transparency, a decoded human readable format is provided to give the voter visibility of the information stored in the barcode. The printed ballot would include a barcode and a print-out of the information stored in the barcode. The voting system would take in
information through the barcode and the voter can reference the human readable format on the
printed ballot.

Give the Opportunity for Election Official Verification/Correction
When processing mail-in ballots, the election official has the opportunity to review, correct, and
confirm the choices are accurately captured when the ballot is remade.

Application or Device to decode Barcode
A separate device and/or application is provided to the voter to decode the barcode and verify its
contents. This requires the voter to trust the results displayed by the device/application.

Documentation to Review Barcode
A reference implementation documentation is provided to allow a review to decode and replicate
the barcode and verify its contents.

Require Identical Information
Barcodes are often used to encode information in a minimized format. To avoid any
misinterpretations of the data, the barcodes would capture all the data verbatim.

Provide Human Readable Format Only
This option does not use a barcode and instead reads in information using OCR. The printed
ballot would only contain human readable information.

Related requirements

9.1.1-A – *Software* independent
This requirement states that voting systems must be software independent.

9.1.5-C – Paper record intelligibility
9.1.5-D – Matching selections
This requirement states that any representation of the selections to match the selections chosen
by the voter.

3.3-Transparency Guideline
This guideline under the Transparency principle states that the public must be able to understand
and verify voting system operations throughout the election process.

4.1 Interoperability Guideline
This guideline under the Interoperability Principle requires voting system data, such as barcode
information, to be imported and exported in an interoperable format. Interoperability allows
barcode data to be interpreted across different types of voting system.

4.2 - A Standard Formats
This requirement states that a barcode implementation must use a standard, publicly available and publicly documented format. The discussion sections specifically call out barcodes.

7.3 Marked, Verified, and Cast As Intended Guideline
Voters can understand all information as it is presented, including instructions, messages from the system, and error messages.

Store Audit Information
Store Ballot Identifier
Barcodes may be used to store a ballot identifier to match with cast vote records (CVRs).

Input CVR Data
In addition to the human readable information, a single QR or other standard 2D barcode is optionally printed on the paper CVR containing all the header information and foreign keys to voter selections. The barcode may be used to assist auditors or election officials when manually transferring information from each VVPAT receipt into independent forms or spreadsheets for further analysis or verification. A handheld COTS keyboard wedge scanner could replace manual mouse clicks and keystrokes which are time consuming and prone to error. In both forms of data entry (manual or scanned) the transferred data is individually verified to match the human readable content.

Concerns
Ballot Secrecy Violation
The information within the identifier is a concern if the identifier includes the order in which a ballot is cast. An example is if the identifier includes a timestamp. The timestamp could potentially be used to correlate a voter’s ballot with the time their ballot was cast.

Lack of Transparency
Information within barcodes is not readily understandable to the human eye and require additional technology to translate the encoded information. Due to the encoding, a voter does not have full visibility or awareness of the information stored in the barcode and being transferred into the voting system. The encoded information may include information that can identify a voter.

Malicious Input/Command Injection
This concern applies to all uses of barcodes but was discussed during the Input of CVR Data use case. Barcode input is also thought to be the equivalent of keying in data or commands on a keyboard. In addition to the lack of transparency concerns mentioned previously, a barcode could potentially input malicious commands that modify data, inject malware, or give unauthorized access to election data.
**Mitigations**

*Enforce Ballot Secrecy*
Ensure that all identifiers do not include any voter related information, including information that may capture the sequence in which a ballot was cast.

*Provide Barcode + Human Readable Format*
To increase transparency, a decoded human readable format is provided to give the voter visibility of the information stored in the barcode. The printed barcode would also include the human readable representation of the information stored in the barcode. The voter would be able to read the identifier.

*Provide Human Readable Format Only*
This option would print the identifier instead of encoding the identifier in a barcode. The identifier would be read-in through OCR to match with the identifier on the CVR.

*Documentation to Review Barcode*
A reference implementation documentation is provided to allow a review to decode and replicate the barcode and verify its contents.

*Require Identical Information*
Barcodes are often used to encode information in a minimized format. To avoid any misinterpretations of the data, the barcodes would capture all the data verbatim.

**Related requirements**

2.5 - The voting system supports system processes and data with integrity.
2.5.3-D – Validate and filter input
The voting system must validate all input against expected parameters, such as data presence, length, type, format, uniqueness, or inclusion in a set of whitelisted values.

10.2-D – Prohibition on voter record order information
10.2-E – Identifying information in voter record file names
10.2-H – Aggregation and ordering
These requirements state that voter record data or metadata must not include information that can be used to determine the order in which a voter cast their ballot.

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**Transfer Unofficial Tabulation Results**
The voting system produces the final tabulation results for a polling station and stores the results in a barcode. The barcode is scanned by a cellular device and the tabulation results are transferred to the central tabulation center over the cellular network.

**Concerns**

*Lack of Transparency*
Information within barcodes is not readily understandable to the human eye and require additional technology to translate the encoded information. Due to the encoding, the election
worker does not have full visibility or awareness of the information stored in the barcode and the information that is being transferred. The encoded information may include more than just the tabulation results.

**Malware/Presentation/Spoofing Attack**
The compromised application used to transfer the tabulation results may make modifications to the data without the user being aware.

**Eavesdropping/Data modification**
This information may be sent using public telecommunication networks via a cellular modem or wirelessly over the cellular network (e.g., LTE). Data transferred through these means touch the internet and may be vulnerable to interception and modification of the data in transit. This may result in an unauthorized user gaining access to the tabulation results and/or modifying the tabulation results before they reach their destination.

**Mitigations**

*Application or Device to decode Barcode*
A separate device and/or application is provided to the election worker to decode the barcode and verify its contents. This requires the election worker to trust the results displayed by the device/application.

*Provide Barcode + Human Readable Format*
To increase transparency, a decoded human readable format is provided to give the election worker visibility of the information stored in the barcode. For this use case, the barcode would contain

*Provide Human Readable Format Only*
To give full transparency, do not encode information in a barcode and only provide human readable information. This would require a phone to scan the human readable tabulation results printed from the voting system rather than produce a barcode.

*Documentation to Review Barcode*
A reference implementation documentation is provided to allow a review to decode and replicate the barcode and verify its contents.

**Related requirements**

*3.3-Transparency Guideline*
This guideline under the Transparency principle states that the public must be able to understand and verify voting system operations throughout the election process.

*4.1 Interoperability Guideline*
This guideline under the Interoperability Principle requires voting system data, such as barcode information, to be imported and exported in an interoperable format. Interoperability allows barcode data to be interpreted across different types of voting system.
4.2 Interoperability Guideline
This guideline requires that barcode implementation use a standard publicly available format.

Perform Redundancy Check

Human-readable text compared with ballot selections within Barcode
A BMD may replicate a voter’s selections in human-readable form – either a ballot summary or marked full ballot. A barcode representation of voter selections can serve as a redundancy check to reduce the risk of error. Data read from a barcode could be used both to identify errors in interpretation of optical characters and also to identify potential calibration and ballot programming errors.

Store digital signature value to notify of potential errors in human-readable interpretation
The barcode in this scenario may not contain ballot selections but rather a value that is used to authenticate and verify that the information is from a valid BMD. Also, this barcode would include a checksum to determine whether or not the human readable ballot information is interpreted correctly.

Concerns
Lack of Transparency
Information within barcodes is not readily understandable to the human eye and require additional technology to translate the encoded information. Due to the encoding, the election worker does not have full visibility or awareness of the information stored in the barcode and the information that is being transferred.

Mitigations
Application or Device to decode Barcode
A separate device and/or application is provided to the election worker to decode the barcode and verify its contents. This requires the election worker to trust the results displayed by the device/application.

Provide Barcode + Human Readable Format
To increase transparency, a decoded human readable format is provided to give the election worker visibility of the information stored in the barcode. For this use case, the barcode would contain

Provide Human Readable Format Only
To give full transparency, do not encode information in a barcode and only provide human readable information. This would require a phone to scan the human readable tabulation results printed from the voting system rather than produce a barcode.

Related requirements

3.3-Transparency Guideline
This guideline under the Transparency principle states that the public must be able to understand and verify voting system operations throughout the election process.

4.1 Interoperability Guideline
This guideline under the Interoperability Principle requires voting system data, such as barcode information, to be imported and exported in an interoperable format. Interoperability allows barcode data to be interpreted across different types of voting system.

4.2 Interoperability Guideline
This guideline requires that barcode implementation use a standard publicly available format.

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Store Encryption Data

Conveyance of Seed Data – E2E Verifiable System
A BMD provides each voter with a take-home receipt (or ballot tracker) that is based upon an encryption of the voter’s selections. This encryption should be randomized so that two ballots with the same selections do not produce identical encryptions. While it’s possible for the BMD to share its full encryption of each ballot, a more efficient and expedient approach would be for the BMD to convey its random seed data (also known as a nonce) to the election tabulation and reporting system. Possession of this nonce would allow back-end systems to reconstruct an identical encryption that could be used for E2E-verifiability. This nonce must be encrypted since providing it to voters would enable coercion.

Support for Privacy-Preserving, Transparent Ballot-Comparison Audits
In this scenario, the entire set of CVRs can be cryptographically committed and shown to be consistent with the tallies without full disclosure of CVRs. Selected CVRs can then be opened for auditing purposes. To protect CVRs from inappropriate disclosure, cryptographic keys or nonces which can be used to unseal selected CVRs should be encrypted (failure to encrypt these values provides a vector for coercion). The physical ballots can have a barcode that stores this encryption rather than maintaining them in electronic form.

Protection from Coercion, via Ballot Selfie
As cameras become ubiquitous, concerns grow about photography serving as a vector for coercion. In some scenarios, a mitigation to this risk can be established by offering voters an opportunity to create ballots which appear to be legitimate but are not eligible to be cast and counted. A cryptographic code could be placed on a ballot to indicate whether it is legitimate or faux. A barcode can serve as a compact and convenient means of conveying this cryptographic code.

Concerns
Lack of Transparency
Information within barcodes is not readily understandable to the human eye and require additional technology to translate the encoded information. Due to the encoding, the election worker does not have full visibility or awareness of the information stored in the barcode and the information that is being transferred. The encoded information may include more than just the tabulation results. Within these use cases the information stored is a nonce or other form of encryption data, that when provided in human-readable text, does not provide much meaning or value to the reader.

**Misuse/Malware injection**
Specific to the *Protection from Coercion, via Ballot Selfie* use case there are concerns that this would allow for additionally opportunities for malicious misuse. Allowing a voter to submit fake ballot brings up the concern of how to ensure only the cryptographically validated ballots are counted. Additionally, there are concerns that this allows for another avenue to inject malware into the voting system via a barcode/encoding.

**Mitigations**

*Application or Device to decode Barcode*
A separate device and/or application is provided to the election worker to decode the barcode and verify its contents. This requires the election worker to trust the results displayed by the device/application.

*Provide Barcode + Human Readable Format*
To increase transparency, a decoded human readable format is provided to give the election worker visibility of the information stored in the barcode. For this use case, the barcode would contain

*Provide Human Readable Format Only*
To give full transparency, do not encode information in a barcode and only provide human readable information. In these use cases, the human readable information may not provide much value to the user if it is just a series of random letters/numbers/symbols that cannot be decoded by a codebook to inform the user what the encoded information means.
Related Requirements

7.3 Marked, Verified, and Cast As Intended Guideline
Voters can understand all information as it is presented, including instructions, messages from the system, and error messages.

Principle 9: AUDITABLE
The voting system is auditable and enables evidence-based elections.

9.1-B.1– Voter verification
Tamper-evident records must provide individual voters the opportunity to verify that the voting system correctly interpreted their ballot selections.

9.1.1-A – Software independent
The voting system must be software independent

Discussion
Software independence means that an undetected error or fault in the voting system’s software is not capable of causing an undetectable change in election results. All voting systems need to be software independent in order to conform to the VVSG.

There are essentially two issues behind the concept of software independence:

- it is possible to audit voting systems to verify that ballots are being recorded correctly, and
- testing software is so difficult that audits of voting system correctness cannot rely on the software itself being correct.

Therefore, voting systems need to be ‘software independent’ so that the audits do not have to trust that the voting system’s software is correct. The voting system will provide proof that the ballots have been recorded correctly, that is, voting records will be produced in ways in which their accuracy does not rely on the correctness of the voting system’s software.

This is a major change from previous versions of the VVSG, because previous versions permitted voting systems that are software dependent, that is, voting systems whose audits rely on the correctness of the software. One example of a software dependent voting system is the DRE, which is now non-conformant to this version of the VVSG.

There are currently two methods specified in the VVSG for achieving independence:

- through the use of independent voter-verifiable paper records, and
- E2E cryptographic voting systems.
9.1.3-A – Records for voter verification
Tamper-evident records must provide individual voters the opportunity to verify that the voting system correctly interpreted their ballot selections.

**Discussion**
Precinct-based voting systems are the only way to meet this requirement. Entirely separate voting channels, such as remote postal voting, do not offer this opportunity to the voter.

Apply to:  
Vote Capture Devices

9.1.3-B – Identification of errors
The voting system must offer voters the opportunity to identify ballot errors before it is cast.

Apply to:  
Paper-based system architectures  
Cryptographic E2E system architectures

9.1.5-C – Paper record intelligibility
The recorded ballot selection must be presented in a way the voter can understand.

Apply to:  
Paper-based system architectures

9.1.5-D – Matching selections
All representations of a voter’s ballot selections produced by the voting system must agree with the selections made by the voter.

Apply to:  
Paper-based system architectures

9.1.5-E – Mandatory ballot availability
The voting system must make available all encoded ballots for public posting.

Apply to:  
Cryptographic E2E system architectures

9.1.5-F – Verification of encoded votes
Voters must have the opportunity to verify that their ballots are included within the tabulation results.

Apply to:  
Cryptographic E2E system architectures

9.1.5-G – Sufficient information for verification
The receipt must provide sufficient information for voters to verify that their cast ballots are uniquely contained within the publicly available list of encoded ballots.

Apply to:  
Cryptographic E2E system architectures
10.2-D – Prohibition on voter record order information
The voting system must not contain data or metadata associated with the CVR and ballot image files which can be used to determine the order in which votes are cast.

10.2-E – Identifying information in voter record file names
CVR and ballot image names must not include any information identifying a voter.

Discussion
This helps to ensure that information that could accidently be used to reference a voter is not used within a file name.

10.2-H – Aggregation and ordering
Aggregated and final totals must not contain voter specific information, and must not be able to recreate the order in which the ballots were cast.

10.2-J – Voting information with receipts
Receipts produced by a voting system must not contain voter information.

10.2-L – Activation device records
Activation devices must not create or retain information that can be used to identify a voter’s ballot, including the order and time at which a voter uses the voting system.

Discussion
The activation device must not create or retain any information that could be used for the purposes of identifying a voter’s ballot, or the time the voter arrived at the polls, or the specific vote-capture device used by the voter.

10.2-O – Ballot secrecy for receipts
The voting system must not issue a receipt to the voter that would provide proof to another of how the voter voted.

Applies to: E2E voting system architectures

Barcode Types

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1-Dimensional (1D) Barcodes</th>
<th>2-Dimensional (2D) Barcodes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Simple and Linear</td>
<td>Complex</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data stored in one direction</td>
<td>Stacks – stacks of linear barcodes;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Matrix – hexagonal, square, or circular</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stores small amounts of data</td>
<td>Stores more data</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>