Principle 10
Ballot Secrecy
The voting system protects the secrecy of voters’ ballot selections.

10.1 - Ballot secrecy is maintained throughout the voting process.

10.1-A – System use of voter information
The voting system must be incapable of accepting, processing, storing, and reporting identifying information about a specific voter, with the exception of blank ballot distribution and online ballot marking systems.

Applies to: Voting device

Discussion
Examples include first name, last name, address, driver’s license, and voter registration number. The voting system cannot prevent a voter from self-identifying within write-in fields.

Status: New
Updated: Jan 2, 2018
Source: N/A
Gap notes:

10.1-B – Physical secrecy protection
The voting system must provide physical security mitigations against a ballot being seen by other individuals or technology in the polling place.

Applies to: Voting System

Discussion
A polling place may use a variety of methods to prevent shoulder surfing attacks for example, a voting booth, blackout curtain, or protective screen).

Status: New
Updated: Jan 2, 2018
Source: N/A
Gap notes: Physical security, Voter privacy
10.1-C – Secrecy of audibly read ballot selections

During the voting session, the audio interface of the voting system must only be audible within a one-foot radius of the voter.

Applies to: Voting System

Discussion

Voters who are hard of hearing and need to use an audio interface may also need to increase the volume of the audio. Such situations require headphones with low sound leakage.

Status: New
Updated: Jan. 2, 2018
Source: 2007 3.2.3.1-A.2
Gap notes: Voter privacy

10.2 - The voting system does not contain nor produce records, notifications, information about the voter, or other election artifacts that can be used to associate the voter’s identity with the voter’s intent, choices, or selections.

10.2-A – Direct voter associations

The voting system must not create or store direct associations between a voter’s identity and their ballot.

Applies to: Voting system

Discussion

A direct voter association would be the voting system storing that John Smith voted for George Washington. Other examples of a direct association would include tying ballot selections to a social security number, voter identification number, or driver’s license number. This is not an exhaustive list of direct voter association examples.

Status: New
Updated: Jan 2, 2018
Source: N/A
Gap notes: 

The requirements within 10.2-B apply to voting systems that provide the capability for using indirect voter associations. Although many jurisdictions may choose for the voting system to assist in handling them, other jurisdictions may choose to handle the use of these associations procedurally.
10.2-B – Indirect voter associations

The voting system may use Indirect associations for situations when a voter needs to fill out a ballot before their eligibility is determined.

**Applies to:** E2E voting system architectures

**Discussion**

Certain channels of voting require indirect associations so that ballots can be removed before casting for a variety of reasons including signature mismatch or death of a voter. The act of casting the ballot permanently strips it of an identifier. The most common example of indirect association would be a randomly generated number. Ballots with indirect associations are not considered cast until the association is removed.

Best practice would ensure that indirect voter associations are only available to authorized election personnel.

- Status: New
- Updated: Jan 2, 2018
- Source: N/A
- Gap notes:

10.2-B.2 – Election worker selection of indirect associations

When the use of an indirect associations is needed, an election worker must select the option for using an indirect association at the beginning of each new voting session.

**Applies to:** E2E voting system architectures

**Discussion**

- Status: New
- Updated: Jan 18, 2018
- Source: N/A
- Gap notes:

10.2-B.3 – Isolated storage location

Ballots that are not cast and contain an indirect association, must be stored in separate storage locations from cast ballots.

**Applies to:** E2E voting system architectures

**Discussion**

Ballots that contain an indirect association are not considered cast. Cast ballots and ballots having their eligibility considered need to be kept separate from each other. Although not the only way of
meeting this requirement, one example would be storing cast ballots in a different directory from ballots not yet cast.

10.2-B.4 – Confidentiality for indirect association

Ballots that are not cast, and contain an indirect association, must be encrypted.

Applies to: E2E voting system architectures

Discussion

10.2-C – Identifiers used for audits

Identifiers used for tying a CVR and ballot images to physical paper ballots must be distinct from identifiers used for indirect associations.

Applies to: Voting system

Discussion

For the purpose of these requirements, associations between physical ballots and CVRs are not considered direct or indirect identifiers.

10.2-D – Prohibition on voter record order information

The voting system must not contain data or metadata associated with the CVR and ballot image files which can be used to determine the order in which votes are cast.

Applies to: Voting system
10.2-E – Identifying information in voter record file names

CVR and ballot image names must not include any information identifying a voter.

**Applies to:** Voting system

**Discussion**

This helps to ensure that information that could accidentally be used to reference a voter is not used within a file name.

10.2-F – Non-memorable identifiers and associations

Unique identifiers and associations must not be displayed in a way that is easily remembered by the voter.

**Applies to:** Voting system

**Discussion**

Unique identifiers on the paper record are displayed or formatted in such a way that they are not easily remembered by voters, such as by obscuring them in other characters.

10.2-H – Aggregation and ordering

Aggregated and final totals must not contain voter specific information, and must not be able to recreate the order in which the ballots were cast.

**Applies to:** Voting system

**Discussion**
10.2-I – Least privilege access to store
The directory or storage location of CVRs, ballot images, and ballot selections on the voting system must be subject to the principle of least privilege.

Applies to: Voting system

Discussion
NIST SP 800-12 defines “least privilege” as “The security objective of granting users only those accesses they need to perform their official duties.” [800-12]

10.2-I.1 – Limited access
Permission to access the directory or storage location for CVRs, ballot images, and ballot selections must be assigned to as few entities as possible.

Applies to: Voting system

Discussion
Entities include people and applications or processes running on the voting system.

10.2-I.2 – Authorized access
Permissions to access the directory or storage location for CVRs, ballot images, and ballot selections must be validated and explicitly authorized before access is given.

Applies to: Voting system

Discussion
Modern operating systems often have sufficient mechanisms in place to accomplish this, but these security capabilities must be configured and enforced.
10.2-I.3 – Digital voter record access log

The voting system must log all access to, the directory or storage location for CVRs, ballot images, and ballot selections in addition to logging access to all actions occurring within the system.

Appears to: Voting system

Discussion
This ensures that any person, process, or other entity reading, writing, or performing other actions to the electronic audit trail is properly logged.

Status: Updated
Updated: Jan. 2, 2018
Source: N/A
Gap notes: Access Control, Auditing

10.2-J – Voter information within receipts

Receipts produced by a voting system must not contain voter information.

Appears to: Voting system

Discussion

Status: Updated
Updated: Jan. 2, 2018
Source: N/A
Gap notes:

10.2-K – Logging of ballot selections

Logs and other portions of the audit trail must not contain individual or aggregate ballot selections.

Appears to: Voting system

Discussion
The device must be constructed so that the security of the system does not rely upon the secrecy of the event logs. It will be considered routine for event logs to be made available to election officials and possibly even to the public if election officials so desire. The system must be designed to permit
the election officials to access event logs without fear of negative consequences to the security and integrity of the election. For example, cryptographic secret keys or passwords must not be logged in event log records.

10.2-L – Activation device records

Activation devices must not create or retain information that can be used to identify a voter’s ballot, including the order and time at which a voter uses the voting system.

**Applies to:** Voting system

**Discussion**
The activation device must not create or retain any information that could be used for the purposes of identifying a voter’s ballot, or the time the voter arrived at the polls, or the specific vote-capture device used by the voter.

10.2-M – Warnings

The voting system must issue all warnings in a way that preserves the confidentiality of the ballot.

**Applies to:** Voting system

**Discussion**
HAVA 301 (a)(1)(C) mandates that the voting system must notify the voter of an attempted overvote in a way that preserves the privacy of the voter and the confidentiality of the ballot. This requirement generalizes that mandate.
10.2-N – Error notifications
The voting system must obscure any evidence of the voter’s ballot selections when an error message is presented onscreen.

Applies to: Voting system

Discussion

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